Smallholder credit in Kenya agriculture by Heyer, Judith
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons 
Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 Licence. 
To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http://creativecommons.Org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
(832) 
(a) UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI 
(b/) Institute for Development Studies 
Working papers 
INSTITÜTE "FOR XOTIMEÍiT S'KDISS 










095545 /* JP 
\ 
Ariyrvlews expressed in this paper are those of the author. They 
should not be interpreted as reflecting ihe/views of the Institute 
for Development Studies or of the IJniversitj of Nairobi. \ 




Paper No. 85 






The provision of subsidised credit for smallholders 
is widely supported as important means of encouraging small-
holder ' capital formation and production, and as one of 
the ways of redressing the balance between smallholder 
agricultura and the rest of the economy. In this paper, 
Eenya1 s experiones vvith smallholder credit is reviewed 
and same of the major issues oílrelevance to policy in 
this field are examined. 
First, the macroeeonomic issues involved in small-
holder «.redit policy are discussed, particularly its' 
relationship to aggregate savings ana the productivity of 
investment at the macro level. The case for providing small-
holder credit on fully commercial terrns is'then reviewed, 
and the arguments presented in its favour are strong. The 
tsase for providing credit at subsidised rates rests on 
arguments of more limitad application in practice, suggest-
ing that the place of subsidised credit might be more 
modest than had been thought. Finally, some institutional 
questions are raised and some alternative approaches to 
those being followed at prescnt in Esí|ya, are suggested. 
SWlLLHOKDER CREDIT IN KENYA AGRICULTURE 
Introduction 
The re is strong support for smallholder credit programmes 
both in official circles and among a-id agencies involved in Kenya. 
It is felt that credit would enable smallholders witli limited 
financial resources to undertake farra developments that they 
would otherwise be unable to undertake; that it would increase 
the amount of capital used on smallholdings; that it would lead 
to a faster rate of adoption of farra innova'tions; and that it would 
generate increased incomes for smallholders who as a group are at 
the lower end of the inoome distribution scale. Smallholder 
M 
credit is seen as one of the most tangible and obvious ways of 
encouraging smallholder oroduction. Yet the success so far 
¿a^perienced with smallholder credit in Kenya is limited. There 
has been disappointment at the rate at which it has been possible . 
to extend credit; there has been disappointment at the poor repaymeni 
resord; and there .lias been a suspicion that the oredit that has 
been extended has not lqd to the marked increases in productivity 
and outpat that were expectcd. 
In this paper some óf the assumptions underlying the 
smallholder credit programmes in Kenya are examined against 
available evidence, and this_is used as a basis for recoramending 
a reconáideration of smallholder credit policy. The major issues 
that.are aiscussod are: 
(i) whether credit is crucial oí smallholder develop-^ 
me nt 5 
(ii) whether smallholder credit should be provided on 
commercial terms, on subsidised térras, or both; 
(iii) what institucional arrangeraents are likely to be 
most effoctive in meeting the needs. 
The assumption that credit will provide a strong stimulus 
to smallholder development needs examination. There are two possible 
explanations of the low rate of capital formation in smallholder 
agriculture, (if indeed it is so low). It is possible that the 
r*te of capital formation in smallholder agriculture is lbw 
because of the difficulty of financing invcstments that.would be 
profitable if the finance ,could be found. Alternatively, it is 
possible that the rata of capital formation is low because 
returns to investme'nt are low. The question of returns to 
smallholder investment is eriticaLto smallholder credit policy. 
Different policy responses are appropriate depending on whether 
returns are low or high. For smallholder credit programmes, 
from the national point of view, it needs to be shown not only 
that returns to investment in smallholder agricuMtatcsare sufficient 
to cover the accounting cost of providing the funds to finance the 
investments, but also that the returns aire sufficient to justify 
the use of development funds and other resources for credit 
progranmes rather than for alternative development programmes in 
smallholder agriculture or elsewhere, 
If smallholder credit programmes still deserve priority 
in the abovo terms, the next question is whether credit should be 
provided at commercial rates,"'" subsidised rates,or both. .The 
argument for providing credit at commercial rates is that the 
resources involved in providing smallholder credit have an 
opportunity cost te-the economy as a whole; that providing «redit at 
««•¡mercial ratos will enerare that smallholders will only use the 
credit if the returns they expect more th,an cover ,the cost of 
providing the credit; and that in as inuch as resources involved 
in providing credit are scarce., providing it at coiiunercial rates 
will ensure that the resources go whore returns are highest. 
The argument for subsidised credit, on the other hand, 
is the familiar argument that commercial rates do not truly 
reflect the opportunity cost of providing the credit, and that 
smallholder estimares of returns are not a true reflection of 
returns to the economy. This argument, resting on the difference and return 
between social and priváte cost/ is strong in the case of small-
holder credit, and it is examined at some length in this paper. 
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A, 
Finaily, "there is the question of the appropciatc 
institutional structure for the provision of smallholder credit. 
At present we have the cooperative marketing societies, controlled 
by smallholders in small c®mmanities,_as one of the main foci 
for short—term credit. ríe also have the national agricultural 
credit Corporation which is highly centralised and thinly spread 
*' < 
thrcugh the smallholder GtPGclS 31S the main focas for médium—term 
credit for smallholders. The commercial banks, which extend short-
term credit, up to 3 years*opérate their smallholder credit 
programmes in a similar way to the national credit Corporation. 
Neither the commercial,banks ñor the national credit ««orporation 
is involved in the local comntunities. They have little a,ccess to 
local knowledgc below the district level of individual applicants, 
local views on the likely success of particular investmsnt 
propositions, cr local sanctiens that could be useful in enforcing 
repayment obligations. The top-heavy bureaucracies that act as 
substitutos are costly, and experience to date suggests that they 
are not very effective, The difficulty on the other hand with 
local, participation is that it opens the system to local political 
influence and corruption. Bat inwreased local participation 
certainly needs to be conside^ed as one of the possible solutions 
to the adranistrative problems faced by Kenya's smallholder credit 
schemes. 
The- paper starts with a survey pf experience with small-
holder eredit.. in Kenya. This is followed by a discussion of the 
macroeconomic. relatjionchips that are involved in smallholder credit 
programmes. The case for providing smallholder credit on commercial 
terms is then examined. and the case for subsidised eredit shemes. i 
In these sections jhe question of returns to smallholder investment 
is prominent. Thece sections are followed by a section in whioh^ 
alternativo institutional possibilities are discussed. Pinally, 
the paper ends wi^h a section in which policy recommendations are 
drawn together. ¡ 
Smallholder Credit in Kenya 
The first offioial oredit for smallholders was given in 
1948. It -was not until the late 1950s that the commercial "banks 
came in with the provision of short-term credit in Central 
Province. The informal channels of lending and borrowing in the 
rural areas are very poorly documented, and although these undoubt-
,edly exist, there has certainly been nono of the moneylending i 
tradition in Kenya that is so common and oppressive in rnany A'sian 
countries. This may be partly attributed to the fact that 
lending to Africans «as not permitted by law in the colonial 
period.(Loans above Sh. 100/- w«re not permitted by'law but the 
District Commissioner could waive this prohibition in special cases.) 
The fact that money lending has not developed is more likely to 
1 
be attributable to the fact that there was little demand for credit 
in the relatively underdeveloped and recently monetised rural 
economy. In recent deeades there has been a certain amount of 
lending and borrowing among relatives; there has been some lending 
and borrowing among clan groups; andthere has been some lending 
by traders in rural markets. It would not be surprising to find 
a few moneylenders emerging in some of the moro advanced small-
holder farming areas before long. Most of the lending has been 
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on an informal basis, with no reccgnised interest charges, but 
very little is known about the \iay in which the different systems 
operate, the extent of informal lending and borrowing, the mutual 
obligations involved, and so on, It would be interesting to have 
more information on the informal credit channels. 
The first loans from official sources came from the 
African Iand Utilisation and Settlement Board, latcr khowh as the 
African Land Development Board (ALDEV) which started lending to 
smallholders in 1948 for "farm development". Between 1948 and 1959 
a total of £77,50* vías extended to smallholders througho\it Kenya 
through ALDEV.' The sums involved were small, the majority between 
Sh.lOOO/- and 311.2000/-,"*" and only a very small number of farmers 
was reached in this period. The loans were generaily for 5 years, 
with a 1 year moratorium, and equal annual instalments in the 
remaining 4^yoars. The interest rate was in 1948, thon ^ /f inm«st 
the 1950s, and finally 6§^ 0 in the late 195Qs. In the early period 
the loans were for l'oncing, terracing, manuring, tools and machinery 
a^iítt the payment of labour was included. (Labour is often excluded 
.^.now, but there has been some discussion about the desirability of 
reintroducing it). In the late 1950s the emphanis changed to 
fertilisers; grade cattle; planting materials for coffce, rice, 
pineapple and pyrethrum; and a:ffew piped water supplies, tractors 
and farm buildings. The loans were adrainistered by district 
agricultural staff in addition to their normal duties, and in 
some districts the administrativo burden on these staff was a 
serious problem towards the end of the period. The loans were 
available to 'creditworthy' farmers with 'good investment 
proposals1. There were also some loans provided by district 
councils using African Setterment Funds financed through cesses 
5 on agricultural produce. 
Loans continued to be administered by úLDEV with the 
help of district agricultural staff until 1963 when the national 
Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) was set up. After 1959» 
smallholder loans were advanced on a much larger scale, with the 
help of substantial foreign loans. Between 1959 and 1965, £694,697 
was loaned to smallholders. This incluaed loans from the 
International Cooperation Administration (iCA) revolving fund from 
1959 to 1963, loans from the IBRD from 1960, loans from the West 
Germán Government from 1963, and loans from the Kenya Government 
from 1964. The average loan was still between Sh. 1000/- and 
Sh. 2000/-
rising slightly over the period, but the total number 
of smallholders who received loans grew rapidly. Between 1948 
and 1959 the number of smallholders receiving loans averaged a 
little over 100 per year. Between 1959 &nd 1965 the average 7 
rose to well over 1000 per year. 
The 196Ó—70 Development Plan included an ambitious programme 
smallholder credit which was intended to rise to £4«3 million for 
the plan period, reaching 3 per cent of the smallholders outside 
the settlernent schemes and the pastoral areas (for much of which 
separate credit arrangements were made although non-Iíasai pastoral 
areas are not at present eatered for at all.) In the event the 
programme was scaled down? The current Development Plan 1970-74 
includes a more realistic programme. In the current plan, the AFC 
has been allocated £1.9 million for smallholder credit, and £425>000 
has been allocated for short—term loans through the Cooperative 
Bank. The AFC is expocted to provide a further £1.5 million from 
its own resources in addition to £-300,000 which is revolving. 
The finance comes from differont sources: the IDA which has a 
prcject in 15 &istricts in which land regístration has enabled land 
to "be used as security for loans (£1.1 mi Ilion 1970-74); -the West 
Germán Kreditanstat fur Wiaderaufbau Kisii/Kericho project which 
started before land titles were available in those two distriets 
but which now also uses land as security (£112,000 1970-74); 
'other new loan programmes' (£0.7 million); and the AFC's own 
funds which are to be used among other things where no land 
titles are available. The IIL. and West Germán credit programmes 
are for a wide range of farra developments, but in practice the y 
tend tofavour dairy cattle investments. .The loans are for 2 - 7 
years, and the majority aro between Sho 1500/- and Sh. 10,000. 
The IBA programme is suppcsed to be accompanied by a 30increase 
in extensión and loaii-admiróstratioh staff provided by the Kenya 
Government. The West Germán programme includes intensive 
supervisión as part of the aid agro'ement. 
Á soall amount oí' ühort—term credit is available to 
smallholders for wheat and maiae as part of the Guaranteed í'Iinimum 
Return (GME) schemo. Smallholders are oligibic under this scheme 
(which vra.3 designed for large farms), fes which the minimum aoreage 
is 15 (6 hectares). Rolatively few smallholders have applied for 
these íoans, as the minimum acreage is high. In 1963 and 1969 
smallholders viere allowecl to apply in groups but this is no longer 
allow^d. 
/ Shcrt—torra credit is also being extended through the 
cooperative mcvement.^ Iniialiy this is cojjing from the cooperative 
movemejrt's funds and from £425*000 allocatc-d to the Cooperative 
l 1 Sani: by the Government for this purpose. The intention is to 
expahd the scheme if it is successful. A substantial amount of 
ere ¿it was outstanding at the end of 1968 in the cooperative movenwrrb» 
Acc/ording to the 1970-74 Dcvelopment Plan ,!At the ehd 6f 1968 it 
was testimated that ahout K£U3 millión was owed to societies by their 
members. Much of this had béen outstanding for a long poriod and 
/ 
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: m'any oí the loans had been issued without 
specific conditions concorning ropajment periods and interest 
9 
rates, etc., being spocified."^ The new schcme is bei ng' t±glrfc.ly 
administerod. Only socioties that qualify can participate, The 
qualification is that they be well managed and this is judged 
by whether their accounts have been audited up to date for the 
past three yoars, whether they are recommendea by a Cooperative 
Officer, and (where relevant) whether thoir Union qualifies. 
Societies that qualif.y for the loans seneme lend to members and 
are responsibl^ for collecting repayments and repaying the 
loan. In 1973, there were 9 unions that were qualifiod and 
participating, and 83 societic-s of the 104 affliliated with 
th.e_ qualified unions were participating^ Most of thesc were 
primarily o^gaged in marketing Nofcoe. In/three years 1970 — 1972, 
nearly £500,000 was extended by the Cooperative Bank under this 
schemo and moro must llave been extended from Cooperativo sooiety 10 and oooperative- unión rosourees. 
In addition to the AFC and the cooperativos, the other 
official organisations oxtending «rodit to smallholders are 
the Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA) ,the Fyrethrum Board, 
the Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board, and the Settloment 
Fund Trustees which are outside the scope of this papor. 
Settloment schemes have boon treated very diff'erently as far > 
as credit is concorned and a discussion of the issues involved would 
re-quire a separate paper. 
The KTDA lends for fortilisers and it used to lend also 
for planting material, but wlien vegetativo propagation replaoed 
the previous system of establishing now tea the planting material! — " 
loans were discontinsied. Fertilisor loans are availablo for tea 
¡ 
at least 4 years oíd and are repayable in 1 year. Started in the 
early 1960sT theso loans were given for 51% of Ifche possiblo total 
acreage in 1968/69 and again in I969/7O. They are repaid over 
ono year through 2'0$> deductions on net payments for groen leaf* 
The loans that used to be given for planting material wero much 
longor: they were repaid over about 15 years through deductions 
on the deldvery of leaf."'""'' 
T'ho Pyrethrum Board supplies pyrethrum plants and fertilisers 
to Cooperativo societies on credit repayablo in six instalmonts 
from months 7 - 1 2 after planiing. Ttr o\-.rges no interest on this 
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credit, The material® supplicd on credit have brcn sufficient fbr 
1000 acres (400 hectares) in 1970/71 and 1971/72, • about 2% of the 
t 1 12 total acre age. 
The Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board gavo loans 
in the oarly 1960sj and sincc 1967/68 thcse have "been provided 
through tho AFC, Substantial sums have been involved but rocovery 
records have boen very poor, ,Loans to cooperativos and small 
growers were rocordod as £111,583 in I968/69, and £160,661 in 
1969/70, but no separatc- figure for small growers was available,3'"' 
The commercial baríes lend to smallholders short—term, 
1 
the median period being about-..i8 menths ana tho longest about 3 
yearso At the end of 1965 it was estimatod that about £400,000 
was outstanding to 3,400 smallholders, about 90 per cent in Central 
Province."^ Sincc thcn there has been moro lending in other areas 
as wcll as in Central Province, aceording to ono souroo the number 
of loans in Fyeri and Kisii is far larger than from official 
15 
sources, Commercial bank rates are higher than those ohargod, 
by tho other lending agencies; they usually insist on mortgagos, 
although in Kisii they were lending quite extonsively before" land 16 registration had occurredjf farmers foar the harshness with whbh 
17 
commercial banks cnforco repayment. 'Theodommercial banics usually 
insist on some previous coiinoction with the bank eithor in the 
form of a savings account or a current account, and they prefer 
to lend to people with regular sources of non—farm income. 
Very little is known about trador credit, or credit from 
relativos, clan groups, and friends. Casual o vi de neo suggosts 
that it quite extensivo but that few acceptod norms have yot developed 
with respect to terms. Until reccntly, most of the official credit 
available to smallholders was medium-torm: 3-7 years. The oxceptions 
were the KTDA tea fortiliser loans, cotton loans, pyrethrum loans, 
and tho loans for wheat and maize under the GMR system. At the 
end of the I96OS there was a chango cf policy, and short—term credit 
is now gotting more emphasis through the new cooperative credit schcme 
which startod in 1970. If ono includes the commercial bank credit, 
short—term credit may have been as impertat as medium-term .-for 
some time and the cooperative credit sóbeme may simply be giving 
18 it a firm ascondance over medium-term credit, 
The.purposos for which credit is available are limitod» 
The IDA loan, which is tho main source of médium term credit in 15 
districts in which land has been registered, has been very 
predominantly for grade cattle and relatcd invest©eji1;2,, In 1970/71? 
83 per cent of the total valué of the IDA loans to smallholders was 
for grado cattle purchases (51$)» dairy equipment, fencing, clearing 
and establishing pasture, and water development, all cf which may be 
assumed to be associated with dairy cattle enterprises, Only 13 
per cent was for crop development, and farm mechanisation, for 
example, was responsiblo for such a small amount of the total that 
19 
it gets no mention» These loans are supplemented by the tea 
fertilisc-r loans, cotton loans, pyrethrum planting loans, and 
wheat and maise loans under the AMR scheme. The newly startod 
cooperatix'e credit scheme will provide loans primarily^for 
coffee producers, in its initial stages at loast.but the loans mil 
not be confined to the development of coffee, Loans are available 
for limited rango of enterprises, and as long as the current 
arrangements continuo it will be difficult.for smallholders to 
get loans for the development of food crops, for the establishment 
of.toa, for horticultural produets, and for many other specific 
purposos. The exclusión cf labour from many of the credit schomes 
is another restriction that has serious implications at |he small-
holder level and. beyond» 
The interest charged on smallholder credit varios. In 
recont years it has been 7 ° n loans from the AFC, but it is a 
condition of the IDA loan phase II that it be raised to 8$. The 
oooperative credit scheme allows some flexLbility in the rates 
charged by societies'but rocontly tho rato lias been 10^ r in many 
societies. Commercial bardes have been charging ".There is 
little question that these rates are subsidised» Smallholder credit 
20 
is probably cheaper than tho opportunity cost of the funds, .. 
making no allowan<se for the he-avy costs of admihistaring tho credit, 




sobornes that are at best marginally worth while, dopending 011 
the way in which one valúes tho funds. Tho subsidisation of 
smallholder credit.raises important issues that are discussed in a 
later•section. * 1 
The sclection criteriá are important as the means by 
whioh available supplies of fuftds aro rationed among a largo 
number o£\S#plicants» Tho criteria in use at the mómont appcar 
to bo some notion of crodityorfclhiness, some notión as to the 
viabilitv of the investment, and somo ability to provide soourity. 
Loans are more likely to be giten to poople with regular off—farm 
incomos; they are more likely "to be given to peoplo with ostablishcd 
reputations as good farmers anq as mon of intogrity; they are mo2© 
likely to be given to peoplc o have ampio resources to carry 
investments through. The criteria clearly favour the farmers who I 
are relatively woll off^ the farmers who only farm part-timo, 
the farmers who have adequate..resources already. The criteria suggest 
a pre•ctswpation. with tilo ability to repay rather than whether 
or not the f.armer really neede the credit. This may make sense for 
a commercial schcme, but it is hardly consistent with the appropriate 
goals of an official subsidised credit programme6 
In spite of these criteria, the repayment record is poor. 
The situation has deteriórate! in tho l$)60s as smallholder credit 
programmes have been expandod. In 1966, 70 per cent of'the total 
number of loans -were overdue (representing 43 per cent of the total 
amount). Of these, 47 per cent (representing 22 por cent of the 
total amount), had been overdue for more than a year. The smaller 
loans were clearly moro hoavily in arr^ars, According to the 197CU74 
Development Plan smallholder loans are still 50 cent in arrears 
which suggosts little improvement. In 1966, the record was good in 
some distriets, and very poor in others. In Koricho district only 
4% was . overdue,for more than.a year, and in Busia only 3 I n 
Itilifi, at tho other extreme, 52$ of the total amount was overdue 
for more than a year in 1966, and in Kitui 50$« 
In part this is obviously an administrativo problom. It 
does not nccessarily signify failure on the 'farms concerned» It 
may be that repayments have not been suffidoirtly strongly solicited. 
But oven if the problom is administrativo, it has serious implications. 
- l i -
li limits the extent to vjhich the funds can revolve and be used 
to finance new investments on new farms. It also limits our 
ability te attract more funds for smallholder credit in fature, 
The administrstion of smallholder credit in Kenya varies. 
The AFC operates through district branchcs and sub-branches but 
only about 1 in 3 distriets in Kenya have these, The branohes , 
21 
and sub-branches are manned by about 120 field staff altogether, 
eaoh branch or sub-branch averaging about 7-8 staff. The branches 
serve the large farms as vjoII as the small, the bulle of the 
business still rclating to large farms. For the smallholder loans, 
most of the time of the AFC officors is tgkon up vith the filling 
of the individual anplications for credit, and the processi^ig of 
these apt>lications. AFC staff visit farms to help fill in/aprlications of 
pa¡íi^ jhich aro also filled in by agricultura! staff, and these visits 
táke quite a lot of time* Once the lpan has boon granted, there is 
liitlo further contact xáth AFC staff t hot-jever. . Parras may be 
visited if the repayments aro seriausly cverdue, in vjhich case the 
' 2 2 farmer is charged 35/- for the visit.'" r Government agricultural 
staff also hcljí to fill in applicatión forras and have to support. 
the loan applications. The agricultura! staff nave other responsibilities, 
and they often fina that loanc worlí takes up a disproportionate 
amount of their timo, It can be arguod that it is undesirable to 
involve agricultural extensión staff in the adráinistration of loans 
as this destroys their advisory relationship with thoir oliente. 
There is no doubt that AFC loan administration is vjeale in small-
, holder áreas. An important question is whether the cost of 
providing a more adequate sorvice viould be justified. 
The commercial banks are in a similar position to the AFC 
but they do" not have the support of the agricultural, extensión staff 
to vjhich the AFC is entitled. The Standard -3ank employ a field 
officer at every major branch and he goes out to small farras,to 
t fill the loan application forras rauch as the staff of the AFC,. and 
he does not normally have time to visit loan recipients after this. 
The Kenya Commercial Bank and Barclays do not evon do this, Thóy 
\ interview applicants at the barde branch and only visit the farm if 
23 the loan applied for is large. 
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• The-Y'est Germán credit scheme in Kericho and 
.Kisii is more heavilysecper ised, and includes a substantial 
amount of farm advisory work. It would "be interesting to get 
an evaluation cf this to see whether the additional cost 
of providing the advisory service could be justified on 
a larger scalee 
Cooperative credit is being given on quite 
a different basis, of course, In the cooperative credit 
scheme the only uirect supervisión is informal by fellow 
cooperative society members who have an interest in 
interest in ensuring the repayment of the loan, 
The strength of the administrative machinery 
is important not only in relation to the recovery of 
the loans but also from a development point of view, If 
loans are coupled with good advice ¿ and if they ará refused 
in the right situations, they can provide an incentive 
to farmers, and they can encourage the adoption of new 
methods and new farra sysiseras with increased income, out-
put and emplcyment opportunities. One is then looking 
to the administrative machinery to do more than provide 
the loanss it is also being used to supplement the 
i 
extensión service. This additional oontribution should 
be recognised* 
From the point of view of repaymentf it is not 
only the administrative machinery, but also the enforcement 
sanctions that count, The existence cf ultimate sanctions 
that can be applied in cases of default rnakes a great 
deal of • difference to the loan repayment p-ssition whatever 
the administrative machinery. In the mid-l960s the 
ultimate sanctions were weak. Land titles were used as 
securities, but the credit agencies were not prepared 
to fcrecióse on the land. Similarly, they were reluctant 
to take defaulters to- court to get salaries or movable 
assets attached. Rec.ently, there has been some improvement. 
Land has- been seized and sold? in a few cases, and this 
h£^-provided a warning to potential defaulters who know 
- 13 -
that threats that they mcy loose their land are real. 
Defaulters have been taken to court and.had their salaries 
and movable assets attached. There is an Vbvious reluctance 
to use the ultimate sanctions: it is expensive, trouble-
some and can earn the agency concerned a good deal of 
bad will, but the existence of a few example «ases is 
sufficient to deter a large number of potential defaulters 
who now know that they can loose their land or other*assets. 
This was not thft case in the early and middle 1960s.» 
This brief survey of Kenya's smallholder credit 
programmes would not be complete without a mention of 
the experiments with smallholder credit that are taking 
place as part of the Special Rural Development Programme 
(SRDP). In addition to the regular credit solientes, there 
^are three different types of smalEiQlder credit' scheme being 
tried #ut as part of the SRDP. These schemes represent 
attempts to overcome one or more of the problems of the 
regular schemes; the fact that credit is not available 
for all agricultural production purposes; the fact that 
credit is only available to limited groups of farmers; 
• • 
the fact that it is inadequately associated with crucial 
inputSj particularly extensión and farmer education; and 
the fact that it is running into aáministratire b«ttlenecks 




a) The Vihiga Maize/Credit Package: . thj.s experimental 
project was designed to overc»me the diffieulties of small-
holders with very limited acreages of maize in getting 
access t« seasonal credit. It was hoped that it would 
^•ntribute towards a solution to the previsión of seastnal 
credit for small maize producers throughout the country. 
Small numbers of farmers were- selected according to 'credit-
worth', maize acreage (between 2 and 4 acres), and ability 
and willingness to follow recommended practices. They were 
given an authority to incur expenditure which they could 
present to a registered input stockist in return for the 
• » 
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hybrid seed, fertiliser and insecticide required for 1 
acre of maize. Stockists were paid (after many months) 
by the AFC# Smallholders repaid the AFC through agricultural 
staff after the maize was harvested. Each loan recipient 
received intensive supervisión by agricultural staff 
during the growing season, ana agricultural staff were 
also involved in collecting loan repayments at the end 
•f the season. The repayment record was disapp«inting: 
•nly 75 per tent of the small number »f recipients in 
the Ist year repaid their l»ans. There was some evidence 
to suggest that farmers were not enthusiastic about the 
loans3 several did' not use loans to which they were 
entitled; several did not re-apply the f•llowing year; 
the stockists were not happy with their role in the scheme 
either*. Nevertheless it was decided that the scheme 
•should be continued and expanded. Starting with 60-70 
farmers in the first year, increasing to about *370 
in the second year, there were problems with increas'ing 
the numbers. The major problem was the intensivo 
supervisión which was thought to be crucial to the sutcess 
•f the scheme. Swme discussions about the possibility 
of usi'ng group extensión methods to s*lve the prtblem 
were underway. The Vihiga experience underlines the 
importánce of the additional staff resources required 
both for extensión and for collection of repayments, and 
there is no reason t* assume that the scheme as o'riginally 
. conceived tan evercome these.The Vihiga scheme is 
facing very. similar problems to the problems faced by 
the AFC over smallholder loans in general, and the • 
loans in the .Vihiga scheme are for much .smal]ier amounts 
*„s© the extra .staff inputs required are even more ditófieult 
. t.o justify in the Vihiga .case. 
T») íetu Credit for Hybrid Maize Inputs: In.Tetu farmers 
att^nding a specialised Farmers T'raining Centre (FTC) 
course in maize-growing are given credit in kind for • 25 acre of hybrid maize inputs. The Te.tu scheme differs 
) 
from the Vihiga scheme in that farmers are selected 
according to whether their performance is p«»r enough 
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to suggest-that they need to learn about maize gr*wing. 
The FTC course is a key input, but there is alsc an eáensién 
, ~ „ " , • • •, • input: extensión staff are suppesed to supervise "Che growxng 
of the crop quite intensively. In the early stages of 
the experiment it was pointed out that extensión staff 
would not have enough time to supervise the farmers 
individually, so the farmers grouped themselves together 
so that the extensión staff eould yisit them in groups, 
making the extensión task manageable. The loan repayments 
are the respcnsibility of the ehiefs. It, remains to be 
seen whether the oollestien of loan repayments"has been 
suecessful. There may .^lse be problems in expanding the 
scheme as far as intensivo supervisión is c'oncerned, 
although this may not b'e so crucial if the FTC course 
continúes to be an integral part of the scheme. 
») Mbere and Migori Stockists' Credit; in Mbere and Migori 
credit experiments 'the input stockists are given credit 
and it is hopea that this will le'ad to the provision of 
21& 
credit to smallholders as we'll. So far this hope has 
not materialised and as there is no particular incentive 
to stockists tá pass the «redit on to smallholders it 
may never materialise at all. There is obviously seme 
valué in providing stockists with credit to enable them 
to earry adequate stocks of inputs among other things 
and it is perhaps wr¿ng te think of these schemes as 
schemes involving smallholder credit. 
In none of these schemes have the supervisión 
problems yet been solved. Both supervisión and loan 
eollection become difficult once the scale of ••eperation 
increases above the very small numbers of smallholders 
involved in the initial stages of the experiments. The 
experiments were not designed primarily as experiments 
in the provisión of credit, still less as experiments 
in the administration of credit on a large scale. Never-
theless the opportunity to expeViment with different 




th§ SRDP could be very valuable, and it would be worth 
trying out m«»re schemes that might have a posg.bility 
of succeeding on a large scale. * 
Having surveyed Kenya5s experience with small-
holder credit, we now'turn to the major issues mentioned 
at the beginning of the paper. ' r' 
III. The Macro-Bconomifr Setting 
Smallholder:credit is related to some of the 
macro-economic variables that are crucial to the develop-
ment of the economy as a whole. Smallholder credit 
programmes may have important implications for savings 
ahcL.investment in particular. There is a substantial amount 
óf evidence suggesting that considerable savings are 
being generated in Kenyafs rural areas at present. The 
availability of funds for the purchase of former 
European farms in the early 1960s; the. phenomenal collections 
for harambee projects; the extent of investment in.trade, 
transport and other non-agricultural businesses in the H 
rural areas; the growing amount of investment in urban 
property; the experience of the post .office, commercial 
,banks and cooperative societies receiving rural savings 
deposits; all suggest that there are large surpluses 
being generated in the rural areas, even in areas that 
27 " are quite poor. It is not difficult to find the source 
of these surpluses, the boom in coffee production, the 
boom in other types of smallholder production, i; he rising 
farm incomes throughout the rural areas. But Jlt is 
more surprising to note thái¿ a great deal of tfye "rising 
income is being saved ra^ ther than consumed, that a "great 
deal is golng into non-agricultural uses, and that in 
some of these uses the fuh,ds earn relatively low returns. 
The interest ón savings acbount with a commercial bank 
or post office is only 3$ per annum. The interest that 
is'being offered as ¡oart of the Cooperative Thrift Scheme 
• 28 ~ • • * is only 4%. «, . • \ 
\ 
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s The amount of investment that is taking place 
on small farms should not be underestimated. It is clear 
that a great deal of capital formation is being undertaken 
on smallholdings, and that the statistics underestimate 
this. The investments in permanent crops, land imprevements, and 
livestock, feneing, water supplies/buildings all add .up 
to a substantial amount. But it is still true that the 
capital involved in smallholder agriculture in Kenya is 
low ctmpared with that invtlved in cther activities in 
the economy, and that it is also l«w compared with that 
involved in smallholder agriculture in some other parta 29 of the developing world. 
If the overall picture is one of excess savings 
coexisting with low rates of investment in smallholdings, 
there are several questions that arise. Why do the excess 
savings not get channelled into investments in smallholdings? 
Why are pressures not built up to charmel the excess savings 
int« smallholder agriculture? Why have informal commercial 
or other means of channelling the excess savings into 
agriculture not developed? Is there any point in encouraging 
the development of appropriate institutions? Is there a 
need for additional encouragement at the margin because 
agricultur© is not quite competitive enough, or innovations 
are too risky from the smallholders' point of view? Is 
there a more fundamental reason why the excess savings are 
not available for agricultural investment? And is there 
any reason to channel more of these savings into agricultural 
investment? 
This leads into some serious questions for the 
national economy? (l) do we want to mobilise the excess 
savings in the rural areas and if so what would the 
implications of doing so be? (2) does it matter if the 
savings are used to make investments outside agriculture? 
(3) is there still a case for channelling these or other 
savings back into agricultural investments? 
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The question of whether or not we should 
«mebilise-the excess savings is not as straightforward 
» as it might sound. The savings represent a decisión 
not to use resources: they free resources for use elsewhere. 
- • -¿The resources that are freed are available for use 
elsewhere whether the savings that freed them are channelled 
into the financial ihstitutions or not. If these savings 
are put into savings accounts in the banking system the 
banking system is likely to use them as a basií-for a 
múltiple expansión of credit. If the savings are kept 
under floors or beds instead, there are other ways of 
creating an expansión of credit if this is desirable, but 
the expansión is-no longer^so automatic, # It can still be 
done on the basis of the fact that savings areknown to 
be stored under fluors or beds, but it requires delibérate 
intervention by the monetary authorities to create the 
expansión of credit. In fact, it is possible thatthis 
expansión of credit would not be desirable and tljat -a 
sudden injection into the banking system of savings that 
have hitherto been kept under floors would lead to an t-
excess expansión of credit,,one that could not be matched 
by the resources available. In this case positive 
intervention by the monetaijy authorities to prevent . the 
excess expansión.of credit would be called for. There is 
thU3 no particular merit in channelling these savings 
into the banking system rather than leaving them under the 
floor as far as the monetary variables are concerned. 
However, there may be some merit from other points of view. 
The fact that returns can be earned on smallholder savings 
may lead to an increase in smallholder incomes; it may also 
encourage smallholders to save rather than use more of their 
surpluses. It is certainly impórtant to consider the 
influences both on the monetary situation, and on the 
generation of savings in rural areas. 
The second question is whether these savings should 
be channelled into smallholder agriculture or in 
activities in the economy. The only merits of 
X 
- 19 -
these particular savings into smallholder agriculture are 
(a) that it may he cheaper and easier to keep the funds. 
«ireulating within the rural areas rather than allowing 
them to flow out and then "back again'; and (b) that it 
may act as an cncouragement to further savings if 
smallholders know that their savings are directly 
benefitting their own local community. 
The questipn of whether these savings (or indeed 
any other savings) should be charmelled into smallholder 
agriculture at all is a more difficult one. The immediate 
answer is that the savings should be used to finance 
investments on which the marginal social return is highest. 
They should only go to •smallholder agricultura if it is 
fclt that the re'turn there "would be high. The- fatt that 
there is said to be a strong demand for credit among 
smallholders does not necessarily mean -that the return 
on investments that it might finance are high. In the 
first place, the demand voiced so often by politicians 
and farmers may not be a serious demand that would' be 
followed up if the funds were made available. In the 
second place, it may only be a demand^for subsidised or 
free ©redit, a demand that does not necessarily imply a 
high return on investments so financed. 
As mentioned at the beginning of the paper, the 
market may not provide a good measure at all of the 
relevant wosts and returns. Smallholders are likely to. 
underestimate the returns to their potential investments, 
and the commercial rates at which credit might be provided 
may well not reflect the opportunity cost to the economy 
of the resources involved. But unless the social 
evaluation of returns is high enough to justify using 
these scarce development resources for smallholder credit 
rather than anything else, there is no reason why the savings 
should go into smallholder agriculture. It iá not by 
any means obvious from the evidence available that social 
returns to investments in smallholder agriculture are high 
enough to justify efforts to increase the flow cf credit 
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into that sector. This is something that needs further 
investigation, and it is a point to which we return in 
the next sections. . 
* Thus, as far as the macro-economic" variables are 
concerned, it is important to bear in íiind both the 
influence of smallholder credit programmes on the 
generation of savings, and the influence» of the programmes 
on the productivity of investment in the economy as a whole. 
There is a possibility that a smallholder credit programme 
might divert funds from more profitable to less profitable 
uses in the economy and this possibility should not be 
ignored. Smallholder credit programmes are also likely 
to influence the savings rate. If smallholders do not 
have access to credit this might raise the savings rate • » » .. 
as. they deny themselves consumer goods to release funds 
for investments. If savings earn higher returns financial 
institubions this might also encourage more savings. 
IV. " The Ivlarket for Credit on Commercial Terms 
There is a strong bias agairist providing credit 
to smallholders on commercial terms based on the assumption 
that it .is ag^inst the interests of smallholders to do so, 
and that. it is not in the national interest to .do so either. 
In this section, it is argued that it is not against the 
interests of smallholders to provide credit to them on i 
commercial terms - some smallholders stand to gain from 
such provision; and that the provision of smallholder 
credit on commercial terms does'not cónflict with national 
development - rather*it can contributé towards it. ••'V «r w 
If-.financial resources are scarce, there is a 
strong case for providing them on terms that reflect their 
opportunity cost. If this is done, the financial resources 
will be used where the returns are greater than the cost, 
and where returns to their use are highest, ignoring for 
the moment possible differences between private and social 
returns. If¡ credit is provided at less than cost, there 
is a danger that it will be pyt to uses in which the 
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returandoes not justify its use? that it will be 
difficult for londers to get funds for credit; that 
alternative sources of finance will not be exploited 
to the full; arid that in the process of rationing aváil-
able supplies some potential users with investment 
proposaj_s involving high returns will be ñenied access 
to the funds. It is these potential users denicd access 
to funds through the present rationing process that 
stand to gain from the provision of credit on commercial 
terms. Smallholders who have good investment proppsitions 
but do not meet the acceptea criteria for selection,would 
benefit from access to funds at present denied them even 
if the cost of these funda were high. Their aecess might 
well represent a gain to the national economy in that 
their highly productive investments would no longer be 
rule d out. 
The other advantages of providing smallholder «rcdit 
on terms that reflect its opportunity cost a^e also worth 
considering a little more fully. If smallholder «redit 
is offered on opportunity cost terms, it should become 
easier to attract funds into the provision of such «redit: 
more would be available for this purpose» Although this 
may not seem very important in Kenya at presen^ because 
ampie funds seem to be forthcoming from the International 
aid agencies for smallholder credit, it does open up the 
possibility of using funds írrm commerciaX sourves for the 
provision of smallholder credit. Savings may be encouraged 
if this enables commercial insitutions to offer more 
attractive returns on savings deposits, although it is 
/ 
unlikely that this effect would be significant in practi^e. 
/ 
Smallholders would also be encouraged to make fuller use 
of alternative so-urces of finance, some of which may be 
cheaper from a national point of view, their social cost 
being less. For exampier smallholders may be enco"uraged 
to finance more of their investments through their own 
absteiltions from consumption thus reásing the savings rate 
marginally. 
/ 
Providing credit on terms that reflect its 
opportunity cost eliminates some of the costly proeess 
of rationing. It is no ionger necessary to apply súch 
careful selection criteria or to scrutinise such large 
numbers of applications. This can represent a real saving 
vhic-h is quite significant, although in some parts of • 
Kenya¿here are not even large numbers of applications for s 
subsidised credit. 
. Finally-, the provision of credit at opportunity 
cost exeludes its use for low return investments that 
are no Ionger worth while if the full opportunity cost 
of credit- is taken into account. 
The provision of credit on opportunity cost terms 
is not hecessarily the same as the provision of credit 
at commercial rates. Commercial rates may not adequately 
reflect social opportunity costs for a number of reasons. 
But they are likely to be closer to social opportunity 
cost rates than* the other rates currently in use, and 
they*may not be a bad approximation in practice. 
At present there is" very little credit provided 
to smallholders at fully commercial rates, the exception i 
being credit' provided informally by rural traders and 
others. Ifr some such cases it appears that the arrangements 
¡ ' . i ^o are such a£ to involve full commercial terms.-' The 
commercial, banks, for exampie, only prcvijde smallholder 
i ~ i creait un^er pressure, and they do not charge commercial 
rates. The rates they charge, 9Í° on loans up to 3 years, 
almost certainly fall short of covering the administrative 
costs as/wel.1 as the cost of the funds. The cost of the 
¡ 
funds is;of course difficult to define, but by most 
definitions 9Í° is very low leaving out any costs of 
administration. The other major sourceé of credit, the 
official smallholder credit schemes, are subsidised as 
s. Tmttoi* of policy. | _ 
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Hiere may be inadequate 'opportunities for small-
holders to borrow at commercial ratas. The cost of supply-
ing credit to smallholders is undoubtedly high; the 
administrative costs are high, the rate of default is 
highy and the cost of funds is high in Kenya at present. 
But if there really is a strong demand for credit, the 
cost would not be a deterrent to everycne. Many small-
holders who are able to get returns substantially above 
the cost of the credit would demand it at commercial 
rates if they could not get it elsewhere. The large 
numbers of applications for subsidised credit, suggest 
that many smallholders are not able to get credit 
elsewhere, and among these there may be substantial 
numbers who would be prepared to pay for more expensive 
credit that was available to anyone. There may well.be 
room for the provision of credit on commercial terms, 
in addition to the subsidised «redit already available. 
It has been suggested that there are problems 
on both sides of the commercial credit market in Kenya 
at present. Commercial institutions are inexperienced 
in evaluating smallholder credit applications, they have 
not been sufficiently imaginative in devising new methods 
of securing loans, and they have not felt able to charge 
the very high insterest rates that are associated with 
a properly administered smallholder credit scheme that 
gustifies itself <sommer6ially. Á guess is that the 
appropriate interest rate would be between 20 and ¿0 
per cent per annum. 
Smallholders in tura are inexperienced in the 
use of credit, and they do not have enough good investment 
opportunities justifying its use. There is certainly a 
problem of education in relation to credit for smallholders. 
This credit is often given to people with very little 
experience of financial dealings. There is little attempt 
to explain the procedures, the terms and the obligations 
involved, and smallholders are often genuinely bewildered 
by the demands that are made when repayment falls due, 
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and the restrictions on the ase of the credit they are 
given. There is a need for more careful explanation 
and education in the "use of credit, oven though this raises 
the cost of its provision. 
The more fundamental question, however, is whether 
smallholder investments can hring the returns that make 
the credit worth while, both individually and from the 
national ppint of view. With the present state of 
technology, the skills and other resources of smallholders, 
and the level of provision of infrastructure and services, 
it may not often be possible to get a return that justifies 
the investments, To get a high return on smallholder 
investments the technology has to be adequate and within 
reach of the smallholder; the smallholder has to h%ve 
the skill and other resources required to carry out the 
investment at a satisfactory level; the markets, the" 
inputs and the other services also have to be available 
at an adequate level. It is often not suffioiently strongly 
understood that successful investment depends on all of 
these things. It often reojiires new skills that take 
time to acquire. It often requires technological 
solutions that are not available. It often puts a strain 
on resources like farm labour and land, and on the 
infrastructure and other farm production services, In 
Kenya, at present, there are some areas and some small-
holdings on which conditions for successful investments 
are favourable. But there are many areas and many small-
holdings for which too many of the basic requirements are 
missing. An example of a high return investment that 
has attracted a great deal of credit in many areas of the 
country is grade cattle, as we saw earlier. The 
technology has been developed, the inputs are available, 
the markets are good, the veterinary services are adequate, 
the skills and resources required are available on many 
> 
smallholdings, and on many smallholdings it has been 
possible to get very high returns to investments in grade 
cattle. This does not, however, mean that all smallholders I 
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in the appropriate areas can get very high returns, 
There are many smallholdings on which the nessary süls 
ana cther resources are insufficient and on these holdings 
grade cattle investments fail» There are some areas 
where conditions are less favourable than others. In 
many areas more extensión advice, more training in 
cattle management, more services, and better access to 
markets are required before more than a small minority 
can get high returns to investments in grade cattle. 
The success of the investment depends eritically on 
the whole range of factors mentioned, many of which are 
beyond the control of the smallholders concerned. 
I " ' • 
An example of a much less successful investment 
is cotton. Cotton do es not often give. high enough 
returns on smallholdings i'n Kenya to Justifv the use 
of credit on commercial terms. The technology is 
deficient, the infrastrudture and services in many 
cotton-growing areas are' weak, and the farm resources 
are inadequate, v/hat i$ needed is more research to 
produce higher yieldingjvarieties of cotton; more 
agronomic research; more farm skills in the production 
of cotton; the availability of ir.pu.ts at the right time; 
í i amd sp on. Until all fif these aspects of cotton growing 
are iiuproved, it is difficult to justify the use of 
credit to finance its production. The cotton examrjle 
underlines the need for a package approach and raises 
the more general question of whether it is credit or other 
smallholder development programmes that are really required. 
In summary, if "tihere really is a strong demand, 
credit on commercial terms should be encouraged. To 
concéntrate entirely on subsidised credit introduces 
elements of selection that are almos^ certain to exelude 
some smallholders who could benefit frpm credit on 
commercial terms becauafe they have suf^ciently good 
investment opportunities to justify the high-cost credit 
and thej^  cannot get access to the limited supplies of 
subsidised credit. The encourageraent of the provision 
of credit on commercial terms whuld also encourage the 
supply of funds to smallholder agriculture, where the 
returns to investments were demonstrably high. It might 
also help to divert some of the excess demand -for subsidised 
credit to which everyone has te turn in the absence of 
«the commercial alternative. The method by which one 
might encour&ge the previsión of credit on strictly 
comniercial terms is discusséd further after a discussion 
of "subsidised -'credit. 
Subsidised Credit 
The case for providing credit on subsidised 
terms is more generally accepted. It rests on the 
difference between private and social evaluations of 
expected costs andreturns, It is also said to rest on 
such arguments as that one-might want to favour'small-
holder investment for income distribution reasons, or 
that one might want to encourage more capital formation 
in smallholder agriculture for output reasons. 
It is very likely that smallholder perceptions 
of the valué of investments will differ substantially 
from social evaluations of the relevant costs and returns. 
Smallholders are likely te perceive risk differently, 
for example, the smallholder*s subjective evaluation of 
the risk attached to an investment usually being very 
much higher than any objective measure of risk. Small-
holders who have been told by extensión officials or 
others that inputs will arrive.on time this year, that 
markets will be found for them, that the product will 
respond to recommended treatments in a predicfcáble.: way, 
""have to take avlot on trust. They may justifiably 
perceive of the risks.atta.ched to the' innovation being 
much higher than they really are. They may also rate 
the costs failure.higher than society would. These 
smallholder. views of risk and Its con.sequencos that are 
inflated from society's point of view may justify a 
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subsidy for credit to encourage smallholders to under-
take investments that are only marginally worth while 
according to their perceptions but very worth while from 
a social point of view. But other ways(such as insurance 
or guarantees) of enco'uraging the investments may be 
more effestive. 
Similar arguments apply to 'education' factors 
involved in innovations, Smallholders may be rela.ctant 
to take ap innovations they do not know, and until they 
have experien^-e of the innovations they may remain 
unoonvinced, But once they have experience the 
innovations will be attractive, The purpose of subsidising 
the credit to finance the innovative investments would 
"be to enable.them to gain the experien?--e to convince 
themselves that the investments were w.arth while. Whether 
subsidised credit is the best way of encouraging such 
innovations is a debatable point, 
There are other sof'i&l versus private considerations 
that could justify the subsidisation of credit, making 
a socially justified investmen+- attractive from an 
individual smallholder's point of view. These considerations 
include externalities¡ the fact that a few have to be induced 
to innóvate before many will adopt; the fact that there 
are diffioulties for the first innovators over input 
supplies, market outlets, etc. These might all be used 
as arguments in favour of supplying subsidised credit 
in particular eirsumstances. 
The other set of arguments in favour of subsidised 
«redit is quite different and relates to the underprivileged 
position of smallholder agriculture in production or income 
terms. Por income distribution reasons or because small-
holder agriculture does'not get sufficient encouragement 
to make its rightful contribution to national output, one 
might argüe in favour of subsidised credit. Such arguments 
are indeed frequently put forward, These arguments have 
to be considered in relation to the alternative methods 
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-of promotiíig a more equitable income disiribution or... 
of promoting smallholder production. If one wants to 
increase the incomes cf smallholders, or to increase 
output or even capital formation on smallholdings, one 
has a variety of alternative ways of achieving. this.' 
Only one of the possibilities is subsidised • ?.redit, and 
it may not be the most effeotive way of achieving the 
aim. Alternativos include the raising of agricultural. 
prodüotapricesy the subsidising of agricultural inputs, 
the provision of more research, extensión, education 
and other services.to smallholders, the improvement of 
marketing channels, the improvement of infrastru«ture, 
and so on. One has to consider seriously whether the same 
funds used in one of tlíese other ways would bring greater 
increases in incomes pr output than subsidised credit. 
There is much to suggest that subsidised credit is a 
relatively ineffioient alternative out of all those 
possible- More direct programmes influencing larger 
numbers of smallholders are likely to be more efficienta 
The decisión as to whether to put funds into 
subsidiaing credit rather than ene of these other alternatives ... 
rests on whether credit is a real bottleneck to small-
holder development or whether other parts of the package> 
are more importante Is i,t mainly, or even significantly, 
lack of credit that is holding smallholders back? Or 
would they benefit more from a similar expenditure on 
such things as effective extensión aávice, research, 
marketing facilties, or education? One usually has this 
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choice» Eunds and other resources not used to subsidise 
credit can usually be put into these sorts of alternatives. 
There is some evidence that in many cases it is 
not the lack of credit but the lack of other elements that 
is holding smallholders back. Once the other elements 
are provided, smallholders can usually find funds to 
finance associated investment expenditures. Evidence from 
Vihiga suggests that both those with and those without 
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credit adopted the hybrid maize package once the 
information and input ¿upplies were made accessible. 
Evidence from the PAO fertiliser demonstration programme 
suggests that once farmers accept the valué of fertilisers 
they do not need credit and indeed they often reject 
credit to finance its use. Smallholder coffee production 
was developed with very little access to credit. There 
is evidence from many parts of Kenya of the successful 
and widespread adoption of new practices, some of which 
involve substantial investment expenditures, without 
the provision of credit, and there is evidence already 
quoted of plentiful supplies of rural savings. It is 
certainly possible that the more important requirements 
are the technical information, the extensión advice¡ the « . i farmer educationf the availability of inputs, and other 
elements making for high returns to investments mentioned 
above. It may well be that alternative measures to aid 
smallholders would represent more effective uses of scarce 
4 
development resources than programmes of subsidised eredit. 
If the case for subsidising credit for income 
distribytion reasons or to counter the existing bias 
against smallholder production is not strong, the case, 
for subsidising credit on the grounds that social costs and 
returns differ substantially from private costs and 
returns still stands. It is for thif reason, rather than 
for income distribution cr resource.allocation reasons 
that one might consider the provision of subsidised credit, 
although as mentioned even in these cases there may be 
more efficient ways of achieving the desired result. 
The reasons for providing subsidised credit have 
an important bearing on the selection criteria that should 
be used. Once subsidies enter into the provision of credit, 
one is no longer using the market to ration available 
.supplies, and alternative rationing procedures have to be 
devised. Many people want subsidised credit in preference 
to other credit because it is cheaper. Many of those who 
normally finance their expenditures from alternative sources 
prefer to get subsidised credit if they can. In addition, 
many virtióse»investment opportunities could not justify credit 
on commercial terms join the queue for subsidised credit 
which makes the relatively low return investments attractive. 
There are large numbers of smallholders who think they 
'need' credit if it is offered on subsidised terms. A 
subsidised credit opportunity discourages other sources 
of credit from being used to the full,. and it can create 
difficulties in selectíng from large numbers of applicants 
who would like their credit cheap. 
The selection criteria used to ration the available 
supplies of credit 3hould be devised to ensure as far as 
possible that the subsidised credit goes to those for whom 
it was intended, If the credit is to encourage those whose 
private evaluations of costs and returns rnake a socialiy 
worth while investment only marginally attractive, care 
should be taken to devise selection criteria that will 
distinguish those cases, Some attempt might be made to 
flnd out if the applicants have alternative'sources of 
finance: what they would do if they did not get the 
subsidised credit. If they would simplyffinanee the 
investment from other sources there would be a strong case 
for de ny i ng ti h e m access to the limited supplies of subsidised 
credit. They will undertake the investment anyway, and 
they should be en t cura ge d to exploit the alternative 
sources of finance, This is not to say that subsidised 
credit should not go to people who obviously: have 
alternative ways ®f finaneing investments: off-farm income, 
bank accounts, etc., because one would still want to 
/nake 
encourage them to/socially valuable investments that to 
them are only marginally worth while. These pebple 
would be eligible for investments on social versus private 
returns grounds, but hot on income distribution grounds 
which we have rejected as important grounds for giving 
subsidised credit. 
Subsidised credit should be used where differences 
between private and social evaluations of costs-and returns 
are likely to be greatest- where the subjective evaluation 
of risk is obviously much higher than the cbjective 
evaluation, where first innovators obviously face 
difficulties, where first innovators need to be convinced, 
and where people need be educated through experience in 
the management of credit. This means favouring new 
innovations generally, first innovators particularly 
people near subsistence levels of living for whom the 
risk of failure is very significant, and people who need 
educating through experience in the use and management 
of credit. 
Much of the subsidised credit is being given in 
Kenya at present without any very clear purpose in mind. 
The selection criteria that have evolved to try to achieve 
satisfactory repayment levels, have only incidentally 
-served the purposes for which the subsidised credit might 
be justified. Selection criteria like the availability 
of regalar sources of off^farm income, the availability 
of sufficient lancl, skills and other resources to follow 
through the investment, and a good reputation in the loeal 
community, do not necessarily identify those who need and 
would make good use of the credit. But as it happens there 
is probably not as much of a conflict between these criteria 
and the purpose of providing subsidised credit that is 
supported here, as is usually assumed. The smallholders 
identified by the above selection criteria may often be 
the first innovators; they may often be the people who 
face subjective risks associated with new innovations 
that are much higher than objective risks. But they are 
not people who are likely to rate the consequences of 
failure unduly highly, or people who particularly need 
to le ara through experience how to manage credit. 
Thus, the case for subsidised credit (if there 
is a case at all) rests more on divergences between social 
and priA^ ate costs and returns than on grounas such as 
income distribution in Kenya at present, and selection 
criteria should bear this in mind. 
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The Instltutional Structure 
In this section, alternative institutional 
arrangemerits for firtancing smallholder investments are 
descrihed ánd compared, building up from one extreme 
in which there is fio credit provision at all. 'Providing 
no credit facilities at all means accepting a natural 
process of selection in the finance of smallholder 
investménta¿ In the extreme eituation in which all 
smallholder investment id financed from past savings 
\ 
on the smallholding, a- built— in selection criterion is 
implied. Smallholders wfyo have built up surpluses 
from lucrative activities in the past have proved in 
some sense that they can make a success of farming (or 
other) activities, and this is not a bad criterion 
for deciding that they are the ones who should have the 
funds for further investments. The troubie with this 
criterion is that it biasses ishe selection against the' 
younger, newer farmers who may be as good at investing 
as the older-ostablished, and it biasses the selection 
against farmers who have large commitments on behalf 
of their depen^ents or otherwise, whose past successes 
do not generate much in the way af savings. If there 
is no market .^n credit, this also means that funds can 
be kept in inferior uses, as there is no incentive for 
those with funás to allow them to be used by cthers 
withput who meqy ¡be able to make better use of them. 
Thus, the bui^t—in process of selection that is involved 
in the absenc<? of any credit facilities has a crude 
rationale with máyor deficiencies, 
/ i i The next4 possibility is to leave it to the market 
to perfora the role of ehannelling funds from those who 
have them to those who can make best use cf them. Those 
who want credit badly enough becáuse they think they can 
get high returns from the use of the credit can try to 
borrow from relatives, friends, traders and others who 
have fpnds, Those who have funds but no particularly good 
use fo^ r them may be er^couraged tó lend for a reasonable 
return. If there were\a sufficiently strong demand for 
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sredit from those who do not have funds, and if there 
were sufficient funds in the hands of people who could 
not make good use of them, one would expect a slow devel-
opment of local practices and local institutions.resulting 
in a market for funds. This takes time, particularly in 
an economy in which even the use of money is relatively 
recent, and when it does develop it does not always- . 
develop satisfactorily as the experience of many Asian 
countries suggests» There is an understandable reluctance 
to encourage any development of this kind that might 
result in the heavy indebtedness of smallholders to 
individual moneylenders who can then exploit the 
situstion. 3ut once this possibility is recognised, 
one might question whether it would not he possible to 
control development of local markets for funds in sueh • 
a way as to avoid the exploitation of smallholders. There 
is ceTtainly no reason why the operations of moneylenders 
«¿ould not be regulated in such a way as to prevent gross 
exploitation from ORcurring, 
There is some evidence to suggest that credit 
faeilities are already quite extensive in the rural arcas, 
shannelling funds from those who have to those who need 
them. The existing ¿curses are undoubtedly facilitating 
a great deal of smallholder investment already, However, 
until some established practices evolve, including some 
recognition of the concept of an interest rate, it is 
difficult to see how these informal flows of funds can 
be channelled very efficiently. The possibility of 
giving some encouragernent to existing informal channels 
with a view to regularising their practices in a 
recognisable way might be considered as one of the means 
of encouraging the provision of credit to smallholders 
on commercial terms. 
The cooperative marketing societies might be 
considered here as institutions which were providing eredit 
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in a very informal way until recently, and which are 
now being used more systematically as part of the 
cfficial cooperative credit scheme. The quotation from 
the Development Plan which was given earlier in the paper, 
made it quite clear that many cooperativo societies had 
been giving credit haphazardly, "without specific c'onditions 
concerning repayment periods and interest rates, etc., 
being specified", and that the amount of such credit outs-
tanding in 1968 was thought to be.very substantial. The 
position is now being regularised, slowly, and cooperatives 
are now being used as part of a national credit strueture. 
The advantages of using the locally based 
institutions like traders and cooperative societies 
a-re that they have easy access to local views on the 
integrity of the applicants, and the potential of the 
• - investments, which should help them to make efficient 
selections. They have good informal .supervisión" 
possibilities, it being relatively easy to keep informed 
on the use to which funds are being put, the success 
of the enterprise, and the case for leniency in repayment 
•difficulties. They have access to strong sanctions in 
the event of default; they can insist on local guarantors, 
or they can rely on the normal sanctions of a well developed 
credit strueture in which defaulters are excluded from 
future credit provision. In the case of cooperatives, 
the element of joint responsibility for loan repayments 
can be used to bring fellow cooperators into the enforcement 
process. Áll of these advantages are substantial, but 
there a.re disadvantages that also need to be considered. 
The disadvantages of using locally based institutions 
for credit previsión is that they are vulnerable to 
local political influence, that they may find it unwise 
or impossible te refuse loans to influential members of 
thé community, and to insist on repayment from these 
" influential members when repayment falls due. They may 
also be open to bribery from those who can afford the 
bribes. It is also argüed, that the providers of credit 
may in turn exert undue influence over their debtors, 
particularly their less influential debtors. These fears 
have been used as very powerful counter arguments to 
any increased reliance en locally based institutions for 
the proviaion of smallholder credit, Yet, there are ways 
of guarding against the worst excesses, like regulating 
the size of individual loans to avoid a major proportion 
of the funds being used for one or two influential people, 
as in the cooperative production credit scheme, Political 
incfuence is used at the centre as much as at the local 
level. Local institutions have to be allowed to develop 
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their own methods of contaming the stronger pressures. 
It is difficult to see why local credit institutions 
should not be developed successfully with some of the 
supervisión and safeguards that aro possible; and it 
would be a pity to deny all the obvious advantages that 
these institutions have over the more bureaueratic 
alternatives that operate in a less decentralised fashion. 
At the national level, there is also case for 
some specialised agricultural credit institutions, In 
many countries, as in Kenya, it has been deoided that 
specialised agricultural credit institutions are neoessary 
because of the expertise required and the special nature 
of agricultural credit. The risks involved in agricultural 
production, the relative isclation of farmers, the 
technica.1 aspeets of farm businesses that give rise to 
special problems of evaluation, all make agricultural 
/ 
credit very different from other forms of credit. There 
is thus a case for specialisation in the precisión of 
agricultural credit. Whether this is through a statutory 
sorporation or a commercial enterprise that is given 
special encouragement, and whether through a specialised 
institution or a more general institución is a different 
matter, In Kenya, the statutory Corporation has been 
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chosen as the major institution in this field, "but the 
Cooperative Bank is also being used in a similar capacity, 
and the commercial banks are being encouraLged to move 
in this direction combining more expertise with respect 
to agricultural credit with their other operations. 
The májor problem with the official credit 
corporation, and to- a similar extent with the commercial 
banks' smallholder credit operations, is the degree of 
centralisation of decision-making, the relative weakness 
of the district offices, and the total lack of integration 
with the local comnrunity orga-nisations. There is a 
top-heavy headquarters operation combined with a field 
staff very thinly spread over wide areas, unable to 
exploit the local knowledge that would be valuable, and 
unable to exploit local sanctions and supervisión,, 
possibilities. The national corporation is said to be 
reliable, less open to local political influence, 
lessopen to eorruption. But it looses out in not knowing 
its clientele, not being able to evalúate well the. viability 
of investment propositions in specific local conditions, 
not being able to follow up loans that have been disbursed, 
and not being able to enforce repayments except through 
the cumbersome machinery of legal sanctions. AFC is 
intending to de*>entralise its machinery giving more 
power to branch officers, but this still misses the 
advantages of operating through local institutions below 
the district level. 
What should be explored is the possibility of 
combining.the national specialised corporation with a 
hierarchy, a credit strueture that goes right down to 
the local community level. This is something that the 
... , ydoess the cooperativa credit scheme cooperative credit soheme/looks promising m that 
respect. It ís something totally alien to the present 
APC organisation, however, and something that would 
require very Radical departures in thinking, in organisation 
and .in the deVelopment of the local institutions that could 
form the base'of a national credit strueture. 
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VI I . Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper the smallholder credit position 
in Kenya has "been reviewed and some ma.jor issues have 
"been discussedo It has been argüed that smallholder 
credit programmes should be considered in their 
macro-economic context; that there is a strong case 
for encouraging the provision of credit on commercial 
terms alongside subsidised credit; that the provision 
of subsidised credit should be with specific purposes 
in mind, and that it should be provided on a limited 
scale for those purposes only; that alternativo 
measures should be used for redistpributing income 
to smallholders and for encouraging smallholder 
production; and that thought should be given to the 
possibility of developing a national smallholder 
credit structure that goes right down to the local 
community and uses the substantial comparative 
advantagés of local insitutions in performing some 
of the functions necessary. 
Pootnotes % 
1. "Commercial rates" are defined as rates that are 
economic from the point of view of a commercial 
institution for the purposes of this paper. They 
should not be confused with the rates that are 
currently charged by commercial institutions most 
of which are not economic as is argued later. 
2. Marris and Somerset P. 153-161 and seminar and 
informal discussions with people working in rural 
areas confirm that smallholders borrow from these 
different channels and that the terms of borrowing 
are not yet institutionalised. 
3. The ALDEV 1946-62 report (p.288> states that the 
smallholder loans started in 1955. This appears to 
be an error as the ALDEV 1946-55 report (p.213) 
says they started in 1948, as does the Development 
Plan 1966-70 describing ALDEV loans. 
4. Vasthoff, p.36 
5. ALDEV 1946-55, p.291;ALDEV 1946-62, p.213. 
6. Development Plan 1966-70, p. 354 
7. Vasthoff, p. 30-31 
8. Von Pischke. 
9. Development Plan 1970-74, p.280 
10. Von Pischke, p. 5, p.l8 
11. KT'DA, Annual Reports. Planting material loans may 
have been started again recently by the KTDA, but 
this remains to be confirmed. 
12. Pyrethrum Board, Annual Reports and material supplied 
by Von Pischke. 
13. Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board, Annual Reports. 
14. Vasthoff, p. 22 
15. Wilson, p. 13 
16. Wilson, p. 12 
17. Vasthoff, p. 22 
18. Wilson, p. 13 
19. APC, Annual Report 1970/71 
20. It would be interesting to discuss what this opportunity 
Qost is. 
Pootnotes cont'd 
21. APC, Annual Reports 
22. Wilson, p» 17 
23. Wilson, p. 17. This information comes from Kisii. 
It is not clear whether the relative positions of 
the different banks are the same in other parts of 
the country. 
24. Information en the Vihiga maize /credit package 
was collected by the author ana P. Hay as part of 
an ad hoc evaluation of the SRDP undertaken by the 
IPS in 1972. The report which could serve as a 
reference has not yet been.released. Unfortunately 
it has not been possible to include 1973 information 
in this versión of this paper. 
25. d¡. Ascrcft, íí. Roling, J. Kariuki, P. Chege, The 
Tetu Extensión Project? Pirst Repcrt on a Pield 
Ejcperiment, ID3S August 1972. 
— • » 
26. Iitformation on the ¿¡bere and nigeri schemes was provided 
by G. Gwyer and W. Oyugi as part of the ad hoc 
evaluation of SRDP referred to above, 
27. Ruthenbergj Mbithi; statistical Abstract Survey of 
Non-Agricultural Enterprises; Press; etc. 
28. Von Pischke, p. 12 
29. Contrast with Indian agriculture in which land 
improveraents, water development, small-scale equipment 
etc. adds up to substantial capital formation in many 
areas. 
30. Verbal communicatión from I. Inukai who found some 
cases of seasonal credit from traders and among kin 
involving very high implicit interest rates, 
31. It i£ only if foreign aid is available for smallholder 
credit and no other purpose that this ib not true. 
32. Mariis and Somerset gives a good account of the ways 
in which entrepreneurs in different fie^ Lds have done 
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